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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-
MUNICIPAL ZONING- PORNOGRAPHY-The Supreme
Court has held that a municipal zoning ordinance
prohibiting adult motion picture theatres from
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone
single-or multiple- family dwelling, church, park, or
school, does not violate the first amendment.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. -U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 925
(1986).
The City of Renton, Washington is located south of Seattle and
has a population of 32,000.1 Prior to the establishment of any
sexually-oriented businesses in the city, "the Mayor of Renton sug-
gested to the City Council that it consider the advisability of enacting
zoning legislation" which would impose location restrictions on so-
called adult motion picture theatres.2 The City Council then referred
the Mayor's suggestion to the Planning and Development Committee.3
In the interim, the Council adopted a resolution which imposed a
moratorium on the licensing of "any business ... which ... has as
its primary purpose the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit
materials," because such businesses "would have a severe impact on
the surrounding businesses and residences.' '4
In April 1981, the City Council, pursuant to the Planning and
Development Committee's recommendation,enacted an ordinance
which prohibited any adult motion picture theatre5 from being estab-
1. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., -__U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 925
(1986). See also Ziegler, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.: Supreme Court
Reopens The Door for Zoning of Sexually Oriented Businesses, Vol. 9, No. 5;
Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 33 (1986). (hereinafter referred to as Ziegler.) The City of
Renton has an area of 16 square miles or 10,240 acres. Ziegler at 37.
2. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
3. Id. The Planning and Development Committee held public hearings, and
received a report from the City Attorney's Office advising them as to the develop-
ments in other cities. Id.
4. Id. City Council Resolution No. 2368. Id.
5. Id. City Council Resolution No. 3526. Id.
The first ordinance defined an "adult motion picture theatre" as
enclosed building used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes,
cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or characterized
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lished within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single-or multiple-
family dwelling, church, or park and within one mile of any school.
6
Under the ordinance's distance restrictions the city's two existing
movie theatres were not "allowed" locations for adult theatre uses.
7
In January 1982, Playtime Theatres, Inc. "acquired the two existing
theatres with the intent to use them to exhibit adult films." 8 At the
same time, they brought suit in United States District Court chal-
lenging the ordinance on first and fourteenth amendment grounds,
and requested declaratory and injunctive relief.9 While this action
was pending, the City Council amended the ordinance, "adding a
statement of reasons for its enactment and reducing the minimum
distance from any school to 1,000 feet."' 0
by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to "specified sexual
activities" or "specified anatomical areas" as hereafter defined, for observa-
tion by patrons therein.
The Ordinance defined these terms as follows:
2. "Specified Sexual Activities":
(a) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
(c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region,
buttock or female breast.
3. "Specified Anatomical Areas":
(a) Less than completely and opaquely covered human genitals, pubic
region, buttock, and female breast below a point immediately above
the top of the areola; and
(b) Human male genitals in a discernible turgid state, even if completely
and opaquely covered.
The second ordinance expanded the defined term of "used" as:
a continuing course of conduct of exhibiting "specific [sic specified?] sexual
activities" and "specified anatomical area ["] in a manner which appeals to
a prurient interest.
748 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).
6. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
7. Ziegler, at 37.
8. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
9. Id.
10. Id.
The City gave the following reasons in the amended ordinance:
1. Areas within close walking distance of single and multiple family dwellings
should be free of adult entertainment land uses.
2. Areas where children could be expected to walk, patronize or recreate
should be free of adult entertainment land uses.
3. Adult entertainment land uses should be located in areas of the City which
are not in close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks and other public
facilities, and schools.
[Vol. 26:163
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In November 1982, the Federal Magistrate recommended the entry
of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Renton
4. The image of the City of Renton as a pleasant and attractive place to
reside will be adversely affected by the presence of adult entertainment land
uses in close proximity to residential land uses, churches, parks and other
public facilities, and schools.
5. Regulation of adult entertainment land uses should be developed to prevent
deterioration and/or degradation of the vitality of the community before the
problem exists, rather than in response to an existing problem.
6. Commercial areas of the City patronized by young people and children
should be free of adult entertainment land uses.
7. The Renton School District opposes a location of adult entertainment land
uses within the perimeters of its policy regarding bussing of students, so that
students walking to school will not be subjected to confrontation with the
existence of adult entertainment land uses.
8. The Renton School District finds that location of adult entertainment land
uses in areas of the City which are in close proximity to school, and commercial
areas patronized by students and young people, will have a detrimental effect
upon the quality of education which the School District is providing for its
students.
9. The Renton School District finds that education of its students will be
negatively affected by location of adult entertainment land uses in close
proximity to location of schools.
10. Adult entertainment land uses should be regulated [sic] by zoning to
separate it from other dissimilar uses just as any other land use should be
separated from uses with characteristics different from itself.
11. Residents of the City of Renton, and persons who are non-residents but
use the City of Renton for shopping and other commercial needs, will move
from the community or shop elsewhere if adult entertainment land uses are
allowed to locate in close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks and
other public facilities, and schools.
12. Location of adult entertainment land uses in proximity to residential uses,
churches, parks and other public facilities, and schools, may lead to increased
levels of criminal activities, including prostitution, rape, incest and assaults in
the vicinity of such adult entertainment land uses.
13. Merchants in the commercial area of the City are concerned about adverse
impacts upon the character and quality of the City in the event that adult
entertainment land uses are located within close proximity to residential uses,
churches, parks and other public facilities, and schools. Location of adult
entertainment land uses, churches, parks and other public facilities, and
schools, will reduce retail trade to commercial uses in the vicinity, thus reducing
property values and tax revenues to the City. Such adverse affect [sic] on
property values will cause the loss of some commercial establishments followed
by a blighting effect upon the commercial districts within the City, leading to
further deterioration of the commercial quality of the City.
14. Experience in numerous other cities, including Seattle, Tacoma and Detroit,
Michigan, nas shown that location of adult entertainment land uses degrade
the quality of the area of the City in which they are located and cause a
blighting effect upon the City. The skid row effect, which is evident in certain
parts of Seattle and other cities, will have a significantly larger affect [sic]
upon the City of Renton than other major cities due to the relative sizes of
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ordinance." Additionally, he denied Renton's motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment.'2 This recommendation was adopted by the
district court and the theatres began to show adult films. 13 Shortly
thereafter, both parties agreed to submit the case for a final decision
on whether a permanent injunction should issue on the basis of the
record as already developed.1
4
The district court then "vacated the preliminary injunction, denied
Playtime's requested permanent injunction, and entered summary
judgment in favor of the City of Renton."' 5 "The court found that
the ordinance did not substantially restrict first amendment interests,
that Renton was not required to show specific adverse impact on the
city from the operation of adult theatres but could rely on the
the cities.
15. No evidence has been presented to show that location of adult entertain-
ment land uses within the City will improve the commercial viability of the
community.
16. Location of adult entertainment land uses within walking distance of
churches and other religious facilities will have an adverse effect upon the
ministry of such churches and will discourage attendance at such churches by
the proximity of adult entertainment land uses.
17. A reasonable regulation of the location of adult entertainment land uses
will provide for the protection of the image of the community and its property
values, and protect the residents of the community from the adverse effects
of such adult entertainment land uses, while providing to those who desire to
patronize adult entertainment land uses such an opportunity in areas within
the City which are appropriate for location of adult entertainment land uses.
18. The community will be an undesirable place to live if it is known on the
basis of its image as the location of adult entertainment land uses.
19. A stable atmosphere for the rearing of families cannot be achieved in
close proximity to adult entertainment land uses.
20. The initial location of adult entertainment land uses will lead to the
location of additional and similar uses within the same vicinity, thus multi-
plying the adverse impact of the initial location of adult entertainment land
uses upon the residential, [sic] churches, parks and other public facilities, and
schools, and the impact upon the image and quality of the character of the
community.
748 F.2d at 530.
11. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
12. Id. The Federal Magistrate found that the ordinance "for all practical
purposes excludes adult theatres from the City," that only 200 acres were not
restricted by the ordinance, and that all of these areas were "entirely unsuited to
movie theatre use." He also found that the City of Renton had not established a
factual basis for the adoption of the ordinance and that the motives behind the
ordinance reflected "simple distaste for adult theatres because of the content of the
films shown." 748 F.2d at 532.
13. 106 S. Ct. at 927.




experiences of other cities, that the purposes of the ordinance were
unrelated to the suppression of speech, and that the restrictions on
speech imposed by the ordinance were no greater than necessary to
further the governmental interests involved.' 1 6 The court found that
the ordinance did not violate the first amendment based on Young
v. American Mini Theatres7 and United States v. O'Brien. 8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision
of the trial court, 9 finding that the "Renton ordinance constituted
a substantial restriction on first amendment interests." 20 Using the
standards set forth in United States v. O'Brien, the court of appeals
held that Renton had improperly relied on the experiences of other
cities and therefore it had failed to establish the existence of a
substantial governmental interest in support of the ordinance. 2' The
purposes for enactment, set out in the amended ordinance relating
to controlling the secondary effects of adult theatres, were found by
the court to be "conclusory and speculative"2 justifications for
enactment.
The court of appeals also held the ordinance unconstitutional
because a "motivating factor'' in Renton's enactment of the ordi-
nance appeared to be the intent of the city to suppress speech. An
16. Id.
17. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
18. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
19. 748 F.2d at 527.
20. Id. at 536.
21. Id. Renton City officials claimed to have relied upon the experiences of
Seattle as enunciated in Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 709,
585 P.2d 1153 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979). See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
22. 748 F.2d at 537. See Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345
(9th Cir. 1982) (Zoning ordinance regulating adult theatres and bookstores invalidated
because of lack of evidence on adverse effects of concentration of adult enterprises);
Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983) (Zoning ordinance regulating
adult bookstores remanded to make "factual findings on the validity of the city's
assertions of harm."); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir.
1982) (Zoning ordinance regulating adult theatres invalidated because "empty re-
cord" revealed no factual basis for the ordinance); Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City
of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir. 1981) (Ordinance regulating coin-operated motion
pictures remanded for factual findings to support city's assertions, stating, "the
government bears the burden of proving some empirical basis for the projections
on which it relies."); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (Zoning ordinance regulating adult theatres required city to present
evidence to justify restrictions); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657
F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (Zoning ordinance regulating adult theatres invalidated
because city's post hoc justifications failed to support ordinance).
23. 748 F.2d at 537.
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"inference" was drawn from several statements of purpose in the
ordinance relating to the offensiveness of such speech and the lack
of specific factual basis for the ordinance.24 The court ruled that
where "mixed motives" were present an ordinance would be held
unconstitutional even if the city's primary concern was to control
the "secondary effects" of adult theatres. 25
The court of appeals further held that the Renton ordinance
constituted a "substantial" restriction on speech, since the effect of
the ordinance would be to greatly restrict public access to adult
theatres. 26 Specifically, the court found that the land available for
adult theatres was not suitable because much of it was already
occupied by other facilities. 27 Thus, because the city had failed to
meet its burden of proof, had enacted the ordinance with the intention
of suppressing speech, and had greatly restricted access to adult
theatres, the court of appeals held the Renton ordinance unconsti-
tutional.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision,2 reversed the
court of appeals and expressly rejected all three of its findings on
the constitutionality of the ordinance. 29 The first part of the Supreme
Court's analysis begins with the consideration of whether the Renton
ordinance was enacted with the intent to suppress speech 0 The Court
found that the ordinance does not completely ban adult theatres
24. Id.
25. Id. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26. Id. at 538. The court of appeals relied on the decision in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (convictions, pursuant to zoning
ordinance prohibiting live entertainment, of operators of adult bookstores featuring
live nude dancing, held invalid under first and fourteenth amendments).
27. 748 F.2d at 534. The "other facilities" included:
(1) a sewage disposal site and treatment plant;
(2) a horseracing track and environs;
(3) a business park containing buildings suitable only for industrial use;
(4) a warehouse and manufacturing facilities;
(5) a Mobil Oil tank farm; and,
(6) a fully-developed shopping center.
Id.
28.' 106 S. Ct. at 926. "REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court
in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR,
JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. BRENNAN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined." Id.
29. Id. at 928-32. Appeal was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)(1982), which
provides the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction at the behest of a party
relying on a state statute or local ordinance held unconstitutional by a court of
appeals. Id. See also Ziegler, at 37.
30. 106 S. Ct. at 928.
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within the city but merely restricts their location.3 1 Thus, the Court
concluded that the ordinance should be analyzed as a form of time,
place and manner regulation.
3 2
The Court found that since the ordinance was not directed at the
"content" of the adult films but rather at the "secondary effects"
of adult theatres on the surrounding community, the ordinance was
a "content neutral" time, place and manner regulation, even though
it treated adult theatres differently from other types of theatres. 33
While the district court found the Renton City Council's "predom-
inate concerns" to be the secondary effects of adult theatres and not
the content of the films, the court of appeals held that this was
insufficient to sustain the ordinance.34 The Supreme Court rejected
the court of appeals ruling that an ordinance is unconstitutional when
the suppression of speech is a "motivating factor" in the enactment
of the zoning ordinance. 35 The Court held that as long as the city's
"predominate concerns" were unrelated to the suppression of speech
the zoning ordinance would be valid. 36 The Court stated that it would
not "strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of
an alleged illicit legislative motive... -.37 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the appropriate test for validity is whether the Renton
ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
and allows reasonable alternative avenues of communication. 3 The
Renton ordinance met this test.
The second part of the Supreme Court's analysis considered the
city's burden of proof.39 The Court rejected the court of appeals'
31. Id. See Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73.
32. 106 S. Ct. at 928. See Young, 427 U.S. at 63 note 18.
33. 106 S. Ct. at 929.
34. 748 F.2d at 537. See Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983),
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
35. 106 S. Ct. at 929.
36. Id.
37. Id. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382.
38. 106 S. Ct. at 930. See e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (the Supreme Court held that "expression" is
subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions provided they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information); Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (the Supreme
Court held that restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, if they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing
so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication).
39. 106 S.Ct. at 930.
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ruling that the Renton ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
enacted without the benefits of studies specifically relating to the
"particular problems or needs of Renton," and thus the justification
for the ordinance was "conclusory and speculative."' 4 According to
the Supreme Court, this standard of constitutionality was an "un-
necessarily rigid" burden of proof on the city.41 The Court ruled
that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of other cities,
with regard to the secondary effects of adult theatres, when enacting
its adult theatre zoning ordinance.42 The Court stated that:
[t]he first amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an
ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of
that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence
the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem
that the city addresses.43
The Court found no constitutional defect in the method of zoning
chosen by Renton even though it differed from the method of zoning
chosen by Seattle whose experiences Renton had relied upon when
enacting its ordinance. 44 Cities should be allowed to "experiment
with solutions to serious problems of adult theatres by dispersing
them or concentrating them and it is not the Court's function to
appraise the wisdom of the city's decision." 45
The final part of the Supreme Court's analysis considered the
question of whether the Renton ordinance allows for reasonable
alternative avenues of communication. 46 The Court accepted the
district court's finding that 520 acres consisted of "ample, accessible
real estate," and expressly rejected the court of appeals' ruling that
the 520 acres left open by the ordinance were not truly "available"
areas of land, and therefore imposed a substantial restriction of
speech by greatly limiting public access to adult theatres.47 The Court
also rejected Playtime's argument that the ordinance is unconstitu-
40. 748 F.2d at 537. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
41. 106 S. Ct. at 930.
42. Id. See supra note 21.
43. 106 S. Ct. at 931.
44. Id. Seattle had chosen to concentrate the adult theatres in one location
while Renton chose to disperse them. 748 F.2d at 536.
45. 106 S. Ct. at 931, citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71.
46. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
47. Id. The 520 acres were more than five percent of the entire land area of
Renton and included "acreage in all stages of development from raw land to
developed, industrial, warehouse, office and shopping space that is criss-crossed by
freeways, highways and roads." Id.
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tional because there was no "commercially viable" adult theatre sites
with the acreage left open by the ordinance because "practically
none" of the undeveloped land is currently for sale or lease.
4 8
The Court found that merely because Playtime had to "fend for
themselves in the real estate market ... with other prospective
purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a first amendment
violation." 49 Relying on Young,, the Court cautioned against zoning
regulations which suppress or greatly restrict access to lawful speech. 0
The Court concluded that the first amendment does not compel the
government to ensure that adult theatres will be able to obtain sites
at bargain prices.51 The Court ruled that Renton had met its first
amendment requirements by giving Playtime a reasonable opportunity
to open and operate an adult theatre within the city. 2 Having met
its burden of proof, the Court found the Renton ordinance consti-
tutional, in that it did not suppress lawful speech and did not greatly
restrict access to adult theatres, and reversed the decision of the
court of appeals.53
The dissenters54 in Renton contended that the ordinance was in-
correctly analyzed as content neutral, or in the alternative, that if
the ordinance was content neutral, prior decisions render it uncon-
stitutional. 5 Justice Brennan found that because the ordinance reg-
ulated only adult theatres and not other forms of "adult
entertainment" it was a restriction on speech because of its content,
and thus a content neutral analysis was "misguided. '56
Brennan concluded that this "selective treatment" contained in the
Renton ordinance was not concerned with the "secondary effects"
associated with adult theatres but discriminated against them because
of the content of the films they exhibited.57 Pointing to the legislative
history of the ordinance and the court of appeals decision, Brennan
48. 106 S. Ct. at 932. See supra note 27.
49. Id.
50. Id. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 note 35.
51. 106 S. Ct. at 932. See Young, 427 U.S. at 78 (Justice Powell, concurring)
("The inquiry for first amendment purposes is not concerned with economic im-
pact"). Id.
52. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
53. Id. at 933. The Supreme Court also rejected Playtime's alternate argu-
ments that the ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and that it was unconstitutionally vague. 106 S. Ct. at 933 note 4.
54. 106 S. Ct. at 933. Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 934.
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found that the "reasons for the ordinance were no more than
expressions of dislike for the subject matter" 58 and that the content
of the films could not form the basis of the regulation of speech.59
Further, because the Renton City Council conducted no studies,
heard no expert testimony and did not consider less intrusive restric-
tions on adult theatres, the "findings" regarding the "secondary
effects" of adult theatres were not findings at all but were "purely
speculative conclusions", which did not justify the burdens ,the
ordinance imposed upon constitutionally protected expression. 0
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the majority's conclusion with
regard to the city's burden of proof. He found that since Renton
had never reviewed any of the studies done by Seattle and Detroit it
had no basis to determine if these "findings" were relevant to
Renton's problems, and thus its ordinance could not be justified
based on the details of those studies.
61
Justice Brennan concluded that since Renton had failed to meet
its burden of proof and the ordinance discriminated against speech
because of its content such ordinance was designed with the intent
to suppress expression and thus should be analyzed as a content
neutral restriction. 62 Brennan feared the Court's decision would "im-
munize" similar municipal ordinances from judicial scrutiny, since a
municipality can readily find other municipal ordinances to rely upon,
thus always justifying special zoning regulations for adult theatres.
63
For Brennan, a content restrictive ordinance should be constitutional
"only if the [city] can show that [it] is a precisely drawn means of
serving a compelling [governmental] interest." 64 Here, the Renton
58. Id. at 934-35.
59. Id. at 935. See e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (defendant's
conviction of breach of peace ordinance because of speech that stirred people to
anger, invited public dispute or brought about a condition of unrest found uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the first amendment).
60. 106 S. Ct. at 935-36. See Schad 452 U.S. at 74.
61. 106 S. Ct. at 936.
62. Id. Justice Brennan found that Renton's enactment of an amended
ordinance which included a statement that it intended to rely on the Washington
Supreme Court's decision in Northend Cinema was suspiciously coincidental to the
commencement of the lawsuit. Brennan also found that since Renton did not adopt
the Seattle or Detroit zoning schemes they could not rely on these "studies" as a
basis for their ordinance. Id.
63. 106 S. Ct. at 936. See Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81,
106 note 1. (1978).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 937.
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ordinance failed this test because it has not shown the harmful
"secondary effects" of locating adult theatres near churches, schools,
parks and residences, or that these "effects" could not be "addressed
by less intrusive restrictions.' '65
In the second part of the dissenting opinion Justice Brennan
analyzes the Renton ordinance as if it were a content neutral restric-
tion and again finds it to be unconstitutional.6 6 According to Justice
Brennan, Renton-like ordinances are only valid if they "are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion. "67 Here, the Renton ordinance had received the appropriate
judicial scrutiny to ensure first amendment protection .6 Brennan also
distinguishes the Renton ordinance from the one found in Young on
the basis that the latter ordinance was the product of detailed studies
supported by the testimony of urban planners and real estate experts
regarding the "secondary effects" of adult theatres. 69 To the contrary,
the Renton City Council was only aware of complaints about the
theatres and the fact that other municipalities had enacted special
zoning ordinances for them.70 These "facts" were insufficient to
justify the burdens the ordinance imposed upon constitutionally
protected expression.
7 1
Finally, Justice Brennan found that the Renton ordinance was
unconstitutional because it did not provide for reasonable alternative
avenues of communication.72 He relied on the court of appeals'
finding that much of the 520 acres available for adult theatres were
already occupied, thus limiting adult theatre uses to these areas is a
substantial restriction on speech.7 3 In his view, such unusable locations
amount to no locations at all.7 4 Adult theatres are not able to fend
for themselves in the real estate market on equal footing with other
purchasers because of the restrictive ordinance and thus it effectively
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
68. 106 S. Ct. at 937.
69. Id. See Young, 427 U.S. at 55.
70. 106 S. Ct. at 937. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. 106 S. Ct. at 937.
72. Id. at 937-38.
73. Id. at 938. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 938. See Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (proposed sites for adult entertainment uses were either "unavail-
able, unusable or so inaccessible to the public that ... they amount to no
locations").
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bans a form of protected speech and is plainly unconstitutional.7 5
The majority in Renton relies heavily on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.76 and its
progeny. In Young, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision
77
and held, that a Detroit anti-clustering ordinance which prohibited
the location of an "adult theatre' '78 within 1,000 feet of any two
other "regulated uses' ' 9 or within 500 feet of any residential zone
was constitutionally valid.8 0 The Court rejected the theatre's claim
that the ordinance was a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment by reason of vagueness. The Court stated
that the inherent vagueness contained in the ordinance had not
affected the theatre nor would it have a demonstrably significant
effect on the exhibition of films protected by the first amendment.
Thus, the Court concluded that the due process argument must be
rejected.8 2
75. 106 S. Ct. at 938. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 note 35.
76. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See Strom, Zoning Control of Sex Businesses, The
Zoning Approach To Controlling Adult Entertainment (1977). Strom, Young v.
American Mini Theatres: Zoning of Sexually Oriented Businesses, 1 Zoning & Plan.
L. Rep. 1 (1977).
77. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
78. 427 U.S. at 53 note 5. The Detroit ordinance contained the following
definitions:
"Adult Motion Picture Theatre-An enclosed building with a capacity of 50
or more persons used for presenting material distinguished or characterized
by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,' (as defined below) for observation
by patrons therein.
For the purpose of this Section, 'Specified Sexual Activities' is defined as:
1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock
or female breast.
And 'Specified Anatomical Areas' is defined as:
1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic
region, (b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point immediately above
the top of the areola; and
2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and
opaquely covered."
Id.
79. 427 U.S. at 52 note 3. As defined in the Detroit ordinance
regulated uses include adult bookstores; cabarets (group "D"); establishments
for the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises;
hotels or motels; pawnshops; pool or billiard halls; public lodging houses;.
secondhand stores; shoeshine parlors; and taxi dance halls.
Id.
80. 427 U.S. at 73.
81. Id. at 58.
82. Id. at 60.
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The Court next rejected the claim that the ordinance constituted
an invalid prior restraint on free speech in violation of the first
amendment.8 3 The Court found that a city usually does impose
licensing restrictions on all motion picture theatres without violating
the prior restraint doctrine and as long as the location restriction
does not create an impermissible restraint on protected communica-
tion it will not offend the first amendment.
8 4
The theatre's final argument was that the ordinance was not a
content neutral regulation of speech and thus was in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."5 The Court
conceded that the location restriction seemingly violated the literal
language of previous decisions86 requiring content neutrality but it
distinguished and upheld the Detroit ordinance. 7 The Court found
that it is the duty of government to remain neutral in the regulation
of protected communication.88
This duty was not violated by the Detroit ordinance because
sexually explicit materials are wholly different and of lesser magnitude
than the interest in the untrammeled political debate and thus, do
not invoke the same protections.8 9 Justice Stevens concluded by
stating, "even though the determination of whether a particular film
fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content, we
conclude that the city's interest in the present and future character
of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion
pictures."9
Justice Powell, the fifth member of the majority, wrote a separate
concurring opinion.91 He agreed with the majority that the anti-
83. Id. at 62. Respondent's claimed that the ordinance prohibits theatres
which are not licensed as "adult motion picture theatres" from exhibiting films
which are protected by the first amendment and this is an invalid prior restraint.
Id.
84. Id. at 62-63.
85. Id. at 62-73. Respondent's claimed the ordinance was vague because they
could not determine how much of the described activity would be permissible before
the exhibition was "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter and because the
ordinance did not specify adequate procedures or standards for obtaining a waiver
of the 1,000-foot restriction. Id.
86. See e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
87. 427 U.S. at 65-73.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 61, 70. The majority stated "But few of us would march our sons
and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual
Activities' exhibited in the theatres of our choice." Id.
90. Id. at 71-72.
91. Id. at 73.
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clustering ordinance was constitutional but disagreed with their hold-
ing that nonobscene erotic expression is entitled to less protection
under the first amendment than political or philosophical expression. 92
Powell applied a balancing test and weighed the government's interest
in regulating conduct against its impact on freedom of expression. 93
He found that the city had a substantial interest in preserving
neighborhood stability and preventing its deterioration and that the
ordinance was only an incidental encroachment upon expression and
not an effort to suppress free speech. 94
The dissenters in Young95 would have held the ordinance invalid
on almost every ground urged by the respondents. 96 They found the
ordinance had violated the content neutral rule, 97 was unconstitution-
ally vague98 and was an invalid prior restraint on constitutionally
protected expression based on it's content. 99
The Court's decision in Young was reaffirmed five years later in
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim00 In Schad, the majority' 0'
held a zoning ordinance unconstitutional which excluded from the
community all live entertainment in general and nude dancing in
particular.10 2 Unlike the "incidental encroachment" of the anti-clus-
tering ordinance in Young the Court found the zoning restriction in
Schad imposed a "substantial restriction on protected activity."' 10 3
The majority found that the Borough had presented no evidence that
the ordinance would further a sufficiently substantial government
interest.3 4 The Court also rejected the Borough's claim that it could
"selectively exclude live entertainment . . . to avoid problems'05 as-
sociated with it .... -106 The Court found that it was not immediately
92. Id. at 73 note 1.
93. Id. at 79. The balancing test is based on the four-part test of United
States v. O'Brien, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
94. 427 U.S. at 80-81.
95. Id. at 50. The dissenters in Young included: Stewart, Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ.. Id.
96. 427 U.S. at 84-86.
97. Id. at 84. (Stewart, J., dissenting) Id.
98. Id. at 88. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Id.
99. Id. at 85. (Stewart, J., dissenting) Id.
100. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
101. Id. at 62. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan,
Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell, JJ., joined. Id.
102. 452 U.S. at 65, 76.
103. Id. at 72.
104. Id. at 68.





apparent as a matter of experience 0 7 nor self evident'08 that live
entertainment posed unusual or unique problems and concluded that
the restrictive ordinance was not "narrowly drawn to respond to
what might be the distinctive problems ... of live entertainment."'09
Also, the Borough had not established that its interests could not be
met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of
expression.1°0
The Supreme Court in Renton also relied upon the standards
enumerated in United States v. O'Brien"' in determining whether the
ordinance was constitutional even though a "motivating factor" in
its enactment was the intent to suppress speech." 2 In O'Brien, a
draftee burned his Selective Service registration certificate on the
steps of the South Boston Courthouse so as to influence others to
adopt his antiwar beliefs. He was indicted, tried, convicted and
sentenced to six years in jail for his actions.13 The draftee argued
that the 1965 amendment' 14 was unconstitutional because it abridged
free speech, and additionally served no legitimate legislative pur-
pose. 15 The United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts rejected these arguments and held that the statute on its
face did not abridge first amendment rights, that the court should
107. Id.
108. Id. at 74.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct:
The Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Velvel, Freedom of Speech
and the Draft Card Burning Case, 16 Kan. L. Rev. 149 (1967). On symbolic speech
generally, see Shugrue, An Inquiry into a Principle of "Speech Plus," 3 Creighton
L. Rev. 267 (1973); Comment, Symbolic Conduct, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1091 (1968).
112. 106 S. Ct. at 929. The court of appeals had held that if a "motivating
factor" in the enactment of the ordinance was the intention to suppress the exercise
of protected speech the ordinance would be invalid. 748 F.2d at 537. The court of
appeals based this holding on its earlier decision in Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d
1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983) (zoning ordinance validity required determination of
whether a motivating factor in zoning decision was to restrict plaintiff's exercise of
first amendment rights).
113. 391 U.S. at 370. O'Brien had violated 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (b) by
"willfully and knowingly ... change by burning ... his Registration Certificate."
Section 462 (b) was part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948,
of which § 462 (b)(3) was amended by Congress in 1965, P.L. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586
Aug. 1965, so that at the time O'Brien burned his certificate an offense was
committed by any person, "who forges, alters, knowingly mutilates, or in any
manner changes any such certificate .... ." Id. He was sentenced to six years under
the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (b). 391 U.S. at 369.
114. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
115. 391 U.S. at 370.
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not inquire into-the motives for the enactment of the statute, and
that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress
to raise armies. 116 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a violation of
the first amendment, because it singled out persons engaged in
protests for special treatment."
7
The Supreme Court granted the government's petition for certiorari
and O'Brien's cross-petition to resolve the conflict in the circuits." 8
The Court rejected O'Brien's argument that the first amendment
protects all modes of communication of ideas by conduct by stating
that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limi-
tations on first amendment freedoms."" 9 The Court then enunciated
the standards by which government regulations would be justified.
20
Relying on Congress' constitutional power to raise and support armies
and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end, the Court
found that the 1965 amendment met all of the requirements and was
therefore constitutional.12' O'Brien's argument that the 1965 amend-
ment was unconstitutional because it was enacted for the purpose of
suppressing freedom of speech was also rejected by the Court. 22 The
Court stated that "it will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
116. Id. at 370-71.
117. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967) The court of
appeals nevertheless affirmed O'Brien's conviction on other grounds and remanded
the case for resentencing. 376 F.2d at 542.
118. 391 U.S. at 372. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the 1965 amendment in United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had also
upheld the 1965 Amendment in Smith v. United States, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.
1966). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the 1965 Amendment
unconstitutional in O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967). Id.
119. 391 U.S. at 376.
120. Id. at 377. The Court stated that:
[w]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
Id.
121. Id. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
122. 391 U.S. at 383.
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statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."'2 By
upholding the 1965 amendment on these two bases, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and found the conviction of
O'Brien constitutional. 2
When the Young, Schad and O'Brien decisions are combined, they
establish the analytical framework for determining the constitution-
ality of zoning ordinances regulating the location of protected forms
of sexually explicit expression.' 25 Young established the municipality's
burden of proof by requiring that the ordinance be supported by a
factual basis, including the testimony of sociologists, urban planners
and planning studies, that would demonstrate how the ordinance as
drafted would be likely to control the secondary effects of adult uses
in view of location conditions existing in a particular community. 126
Some courts have adopted this view of the city's burden of proof
1 27
while some have held that municipalities "might rely on the experi-
ences of other cities . .. as the basis for regulation.' 28 Young also
adopted the O'Brien test to determine if the government's purpose
for enacting the regulation is "unrelated to the suppression of free
speech.' '1 29 A number of post-Young court decisions have held or-
dinances invalid on the ground that the regulation was motivated in
part by simply a desire to suppress sexually explicit speech. 30 Other
courts found that where mixed motives existed the fact that improper
intent to suppress was simply a motivating factor would by itself be
sufficient to invalidate the ordinance.13 1 The Court in Schad stated
123. Id.
124. Id. at 386. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, finding that the ultimate issue
for resolution was whether "conscription is permissible in the absence of a declaration
of war." This issue had not been briefed or argued by either party but Douglas
thought the case should be reargued because he felt the defendant and the country
were "entitled" to have this issue resolved. Id. at 389.
125. Ziegler, at 34.
126. 427 U.S. at 71 note 35. See Ziegler, at 35.
127. Ziegler, at 35. See e.g., 754 Orange Ave., Inc. v. City of New Haven,
761 F.2d 105, 112 (2nd Cir. 1985); Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 852
(lth Cir. 1985); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981).
Id.
128. Ziegler, at 35. See e.g., Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1211
(1980); Strand Property Corp. v. Municipal Court, 200 Cal.Rptr. 47, 148 Cal. App.
3d 882 (1984); International Food v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614 F. Supp. 1517,
1521 (D.C. Fla. 1985). Id.
129. 391 U.S. at 377. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
130. Ziegler, at 36. See e.g., Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.
1983); C.L.R. Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983); Avalon Cinema
Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981). Id.
131. Ziegler, at 36. See e.g., Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 649 F.2d 851, 855-
56 (11th Cir. 1985); Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983). Id.
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that an ordinance which restricts the locations of adult businesses
would impose a heavy burden on the municipality to show that such
a restriction furthers a substantial governmental interest. 132 In post-
Young litigation, a few courts have ruled adult use ordinances
unconstitutional finding that regulation would unnecessarily confine
adult uses to only a few locations, prohibit new uses or would reduce
the number of existing uses. 133 Other decisions have examined the
availability or suitability of potential locations under an ordinance
and have held that the ordinances suppress expression or greatly
restrict access to adult uses where the locations are not "realistically"
available from the point of view of a "reasonably prudent inves-
tor.' '134 The general effect of post-Young litigation has been to close
the door on local zoning of sexually oriented businesses.
The most immediate effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Renton will be to reopen the door for zoning of sexually oriented
businesses that had been partially closed by post-Young litigation.
135
The precedential value of those cases which found zoning ordinances
unconstitutional based on "mixed motives" in the enactment of the
ordinance or on the basis that locations were unavailable based upon
the reasonably prudent investor standard have now been eliminated. 1
36
Municipalities can now arm themselves with the experiences of other
cities as described in Young and Northend Cinema37 and enact
equally restrictive Renton- like ordinances that concentrate or disperse
adult theatre locations. 38 Municipalities could also rely on the Renton




132. 452 U.S. at 80. See Ziegler, at 36.
133. Ziegler, at 36. See e.g, C.L.R. Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.
1983); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1982); Adultword
Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985). Id.
134. Ziegler, at 36. See e.g., International Foods v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
614 F. Supp. 1517 (D.C. Fla. 1985); North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of
Endicott, 582 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Basiardines v. City of Galveston,
682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207
(N.D. Ga. 1981). Id.
135. Ziegler, at 39. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
136. Ziegler, at 39. See supra notes 130, 131, 134 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
138. Ziegler, at 39.
139. Id.
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